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INTRODUCTION
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort of
hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often
1
disputatious, society.

The interplay between student freedom of speech and school
maintenance of authority is a recurring issue in American high
schools. The messages that students seek to convey to one another
through clothing range from frivolous to serious, from crude to
2
sophisticated, from mundane to controversial. While many students
make their clothing choices with an eye on fashion, popularity, or
fitting in, others seek to convey a message about religious, political,
or moral issues of importance to them.
Student expression
sometimes touches upon controversial issues such as American
involvement in war, support for the president, religion, politics,
3
abortion, marriage, homosexuality, and immigration reform.
Students whose clothing deals with controversial topics may want to
spark conversations, change other students’ minds, or simply express
their opinions to their peers. Often, however, any actual or potential
controversy that may arise between students over the content of a
controversial shirt, armband, or other clothing is overshadowed by a
conflict that develops between the speaker and school officials who
punish the student for wearing the expressive item or prohibit him or
4
her from wearing it in the future. At that point, the student’s
insistence on a right to continue to wear the expressive clothing tests

1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969)
(citation omitted).
2. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269 (1988)
(holding that a principal had the authority to prohibit students from publishing an
article about teen pregnancy in the school’s newspaper).
3. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (stating that several students wore black
armbands to their school to protest the Vietnam War).
4. See id. at 505 (noting that several students were suspended from school for
wearing armbands as a form of protest and were not permitted to come back to
school until they returned without the armbands).
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the limits upon the school’s authority to control the educational
5
environment.
As numerous federal court cases make clear, sometimes school
districts overstep their bounds and violate students’ right to freedom
6
of speech, while other times their actions are legally permissible.
While some well-established principles have emerged over the course
of decades of litigation, the case-by-case nature of the legal standards
involved can make it difficult to predict how courts will apply existing
precedent to any particular set of facts. It is clear, however, that some
courts have sought to preserve the greatest extent of student freedom
of speech possible while others have given educators much greater
7
leeway to restrict controversial student speech.
This Article argues for broad First Amendment protection for
“controversial” religious and pro-life student expression. The vast
majority of religious and pro-life clothing is no more likely to create
an actual disturbance that substantially disrupts school functions than
a peace armband worn during Vietnam, the student expression
upheld in the seminal case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
8
Community School District. Section I of this Article discusses several
Supreme Court student speech cases with an emphasis on their
applicability to situations involving high school students who wear
“controversial” religious and pro-life clothing. This section argues
that Tinker’s substantial disruption test—not Tinker’s “rights of others”
9
dicta or Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser —provides the
appropriate mode of analysis for cases involving “controversial”
religious and pro-life clothing.
Section II reviews several lower court cases that have considered
restrictions on student religious or pro-life speech. This section

5. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (explaining
that schools teach students how to behave in a mature and civil manner).
6. Compare Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975
(S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that a student’s First Amendment rights were violated
when school administrators told him to leave school for wearing a religious t-shirt),
with Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007) (holding that school administrators had
the authority to suspend a student for wearing a religious t-shirt that condemned
homosexuality).
7. See infra Part II.A–B (comparing cases where courts have protected the
student’s right to self-expression to cases where the courts emphasized the need for
the school to maintain an orderly learning environment).
8. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 740 (reversing the lower court and permitting students
to wear armbands illustrating their disagreement with the Vietnam War because the
armbands did not create a substantial disturbance in the classroom).
9. For a discussion of Bethel, one of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases,
see infra Section I.C.
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argues that Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education,
11
K.D. ex rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Central School District, and Saxe ex rel. Saxe
12
v. State College Area School District present a proper reading of Tinker
by providing broad protection for controversial student speech.
13
Conversely, Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District and
14
Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School District provide insufficient
protection for student religious and pro-life expression. The Article
concludes by encouraging lower courts to follow the reasoning of the
more speech-protective cases whenever possible.
It is important to note that, while this article focuses on religious
and pro-life student expression that might be considered to be
“controversial,” all religious and pro-life speech may be characterized
as controversial in some sense. Religious speech often touches upon
one’s most fundamental understanding of the universe and human
existence, and one’s moral, social, and political worldview. Religious
speakers often encourage those who hear or read their messages to
reconsider their religious beliefs, reexamine their understanding of
15
right and wrong, or take, or refrain from taking, certain actions.
Similarly, speakers who oppose abortion often express their strong
disagreement with abortion in stark terms and urge others to
reconsider their beliefs about the morality of abortion. If schools are
permitted to use a heavy hand in restricting student expression that,
in the school’s view, “attacks” other students’ belief systems (by
challenging them to reconsider their views) or speech that may
offend some students or make them feel uncomfortable, a vast
expanse of student religious and pro-life expression will be subject to
censorship.
I.

SUPREME COURT CASES GOVERNING STUDENT SPEECH

The Supreme Court has on several occasions considered the
interplay between the authority of public schools to govern student
conduct and the right of students to convey (or refuse to convey) a
message. This Section reviews five key cases with an emphasis on
their relevance for cases involving religious, pro-life, and protraditional marriage t-shirts.

10. 383 F. Supp. 2d at 965.
11. No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).
12. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
13. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
14. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
15. See, e.g., K.D., 2005 WL 2175166, at *1–3 (describing the case of a student
who wore a shirt to school that criticized abortion and alluded to the value of life).
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A. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
16

In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court held
that a public school could not compel students to recite the Pledge of
17
Although subject to
Allegiance over their religious objections.
expulsion from school, some students refused to recite the Pledge
18
because doing so would violate their religious beliefs.
While acknowledging that “the State may ‘require teaching by
instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and
organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil
19
liberty, which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country,’” the
Court noted, “[h]ere, however, we are dealing with a compulsion of
students to declare a belief. They are not merely made acquainted
with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to what it is or
20
even what it means.” Although the educational functions of school
officials are important, the Court declared that there were “none that
21
they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.”
The Court added:
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
22
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.

While Barnette has been treated primarily as a “compelled speech”
case, it has continued relevance in the context of controversial
student speech. Barnette stands for the principle that school officials
may not trample upon students’ right to freedom of speech in their
eagerness to promote an ideal such as patriotism, love of country, or,
in the current setting, tolerance of other students’ beliefs and
23
actions.

16. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
17. Id. at 642. The Court noted that the First Amendment protects dissenters
from being coerced by governmental officials. Id.
18. Id. at 629.
19. Id. at 631 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 637.
22. Id. at 642.
23. See id. at 644 (explaining that the toleration of conflicting viewpoints is
essentially a benchmark of democracy).
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B. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
24

Tinker stands as the pinnacle of student speech rights. In Tinker, a
group of junior high school and senior high school students decided
to wear black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War and
25
publicize their support for a truce. When school officials learned of
the students’ proposed activities, they enacted a policy prohibiting
26
students from wearing armbands during school. Nevertheless, the
27
students wore their black armbands and were suspended.
The Supreme Court declared that “the wearing of armbands in the
circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or
28
potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it” and “was
closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is
29
entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”
The Court noted that “First Amendment rights, applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to
30
teachers and students,” and declared that “[i]t can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
31
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
In particular, public schools may not stifle student speech simply
because it expresses a viewpoint that differs from the school’s
viewpoint on controversial issues:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. . . . In our system, students may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate. . . . In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are
32
entitled to freedom of expression of their views.

The Court elaborated on the scope of student speech rights,
stating:
A student’s rights . . . do not embrace merely the classroom hours.
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions,
24. See Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School
Authority over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1206, 1211–14 (2008) (discussing how later cases such as Fraser, Hazelwood and
Morse limit student speech beyond the broad rule espoused in Tinker that greatly
protected students’ First Amendment rights).
25. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 505.
29. Id. at 505–06.
30. Id. at 506.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 511.
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even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he
does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
33
school” and without colliding with the rights of others.

The Court held that the school violated the students’ right to
freedom of speech by prohibiting them from wearing armbands,
stating that there was no evidence “that the school authorities had
reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
34
the rights of other students.” Regarding the non-disruptive nature
of the students’ expression, the Court noted:
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a
silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any
disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here
no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or
nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this
case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the
35
work of the schools or the rights of other students.

While speech restrictions enacted by public school officials must be
based on more than “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
36
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,” the
school’s actions in this case “appear[] to have been based upon an
urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the
expression, even by the silent symbol of armbands, of opposition to
37
this Nation’s part in the conflagration in Vietnam.”
The broad
scope of the Tinker Court’s protection of controversial student “pure
38
speech” cannot be understated.
Justice Black stated in his dissenting opinion that “students, like
other people, cannot concentrate on lesser issues when black
armbands are being ostentatiously displayed in their presence to call
attention to the wounded and dead of the war, some of the wounded
39
and the dead being their friends and neighbors.” Moreover, Justice
Black observed:
[The students’] armbands caused comments, warnings by other
students, the poking of fun at them, and a warning by an older
33. Id. at 512–13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
34. Id. at 509.
35. Id. at 508.
36. Id. at 509.
37. Id. at 510.
38. See id. at 505–06 (noting that “pure speech” is entitled to significant
protection under the First Amendment).
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black., J., dissenting).
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football player that other, nonprotesting students had better let
them alone. . . . [A] teacher of mathematics had his lesson period
practically “wrecked” chiefly by disputes with Mary Beth Tinker,
40
who wore her armband for her “demonstration.”

Despite these facts, however, the majority opinion explained that a
school cannot censor student expression simply because it may foster
debate or trigger arguments among students. The Court observed
that, “in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
41
expression.”
Since Tinker was decided, many commentators have debated
whether the decision (and subsequent cases interpreting and
applying it) struck the proper balance between the interests of
42
schools and the speech rights of students. Some have argued that
the courts have given too little weight to the arguments of school
administrators. One author has declared that “[w]ith every decision
upholding students’ right to free expression in public schools, the
federal courts of this country weaken the structural integrity of the
43
foundation that is our system of public education.”
Another
commentator has argued that Tinker’s material disruption standard
should be lessened to allow schools to regulate speech that merely
distracts other students “for the sake of better promoting the school’s
44
varied basic missions and purposes.”
On the other hand, some have defended Tinker and argued for the
greatest protection of student expression possible. One author has
stated that “[c]ountless rationales are given as to why student’s free
40. Id. at 517–18.
41. Id. at 508 (majority opinion).
42. This debate has not been confined solely to Tinker but has engulfed its
progeny as well. See infra notes 123–132 and accompanying text (discussing how
Morse has further blurred the line between the authority of the school and the
constitutional freedoms of its students).
43. Michael C. Jacobson, Note, Chaos in Public Schools: Federal Courts Yield to
Students While Administrators and Teachers Struggle To Control the Increasingly Violent and
Disorderly Scholastic Environment, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 909, 909 (2006).
This author posits that
[w]here the potential exists (for any student who has not reached the age of
majority) for the school’s educational mission to be disrupted by political or
religious rhetoric, the value of a pure education—the ability to formulate one’s
own opinion, rather than have the opinion of another student forced upon
them—must substantially outweigh the value of unfettered First Amendment
rights of students who the Supreme Court has classified as “unemancipated.”
Id. at 929 (citation omitted).
44. R. George Wright, Tinker and Student Free Speech Rights: A Functionalist
Alternative, 41 IND. L. REV. 105, 109 (2008); see also id. (“Individual public schools
should be permitted reasonable experimental latitude in fairly regulating student
speech that causes distraction in order to better discharge the school’s overall
educational and community responsibilities.”).
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speech rights should be limited, but none are persuasive. Rather,
school students should be given the opportunity to exercise
45
constitutional rights to better prepare them for adulthood.”
Another commentator has declared that Tinker is based on the idea
that “[a]chieving free expression requires an open marketplace in
which citizens are susceptible to varied viewpoints. Moreover, schools
are parts of that marketplace, with students entitled to the privileges
46
of citizenry.” In addition,
[o]ne corollary of intolerance and the silencing of dissent is
conformity. Individuals who choose to be nonconformist are
sometimes viewed as problematic by authorities. Those authorities
who suppress disagreement often do so to achieve uniform
47
allegiance to—and acceptance of—their belief systems.

Unpopular or controversial student speech is deserving of broad
protection precisely because it is likely to prompt discussion and
debate among students. One author has noted that “[p]olitical,
religious, literary, intellectual, and artistic expression can contribute
to the development of children’s moral powers, so expression in
48
While expression in
these categories merits special protection.”
these categories may cause some students to reconsider their own
beliefs and behaviors, that is no reason to censor student speech.
The Supreme Court’s more recent student speech cases have served
to fuel, rather than end, debate over Tinker.
C. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
49

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser presented the Court with its
50
first opportunity to apply Tinker to a student free speech case. In
Fraser, a high school student delivered a speech nominating a fellow
51
student for student government at a school-sponsored assembly.
52
Students were required to attend either the assembly or a study hall.
45. Brandon James Hoover, An Analysis of the Applicability of First Amendment
Freedom of Speech Protections to Students in Public Schools, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 39, 62
(2008).
46. Joseph Russomanno, Dissent Yesterday and Today: The Tinker Case and Its
Legacy, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 367, 375–76 (2006).
47. Id. at 382; see also William Galston, When Well-Being Trumps Liberty: Political
Theory, Jurisprudence, and Children’s Rights, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 279, 280 (2004)
(“[W]e are not free simply to balance speech, or religious free exercise, against
considerations of social utility.”).
48. Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of Expression for Children, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 55, 79 (2004).
49. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
50. After Tinker was decided in 1969, the Supreme Court did not decide another
student speech case until Fraser in 1986.
51. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
52. Id.
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About 600 students attended the assembly, many of whom were
53
The speech at issue was filled with sexual
fourteen years old.
54
innuendo.
“During Fraser’s delivery of the speech, . . . . [s]ome
students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated
55
The
the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in [his] speech.”
student was suspended for violating the school’s policy prohibiting
56
obscene language.
The Fraser Court held that the school “acted entirely within its
permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response
57
to his offensively lewd and indecent speech.” The Court noted that
“the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political
58
viewpoint.” Moreover,
[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational
mission. A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting
59
audience of teenage students.

The Court explained “[t]he marked distinction between the
political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content
60
of respondent’s speech in this case” and observed that it had
repeatedly acknowledged the importance of protecting children from
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, vulgar, lewd, and offensive
61
speech. As such, “‘the First Amendment gives a high school student
the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s
62
jacket.’”

53. Id.
54. For portions of the speech, see Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion. Id. at
687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 678 (majority opinion).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 685.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 680.
61. Id. at 684; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (holding
that the obscene content of a radio broadcast could be regulated, due to the fact that
children may be listening); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638–39 (1968)
(ruling that the State has the right to limit people from selling sexually explicit
material to minors).
62. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch.
Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)). In Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court invalidated the conviction of a Vietnam War
protester for breaching the peace by wearing a jacket that said “Fuck the Draft” in a
courthouse corridor. Id. at 26.
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In addition, the Court found the role of public schools as
63
institutions that “inculcate the habits and manners of civility” and
64
“prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse”
to be significant, noting that “[e]ven the most heated political
discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the
65
personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.” The
Court noted Congress’s longstanding practice of prohibiting the use
of indecent, abusive, or offensive language during floor debates and
asked, “[c]an it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is
66
beyond the reach of school officials to regulate?”
The Court
declared that:
[t]hese fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility”
essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance
of divergent political and religious views, even when the views
expressed may be unpopular. But these “fundamental values” must
also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others,
67
and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students.

The Court held that “[t]he pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s
speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and students—indeed to
68
any mature person.”
Lower courts have struggled to interpret Fraser in cases that do not
69
involve sexual innuendo. As a general matter, “Fraser is commonly
read to treat speech that is lewd or offensive in its manner of
expression as low-value speech in the schools even though such
70
speech enjoys more protection elsewhere.”
However, a “broad
reading of Fraser [would] allow[] a school to restrict any speech that

63. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
64. Id. at 683.
65. Id. at 681.
66. Id. at 682.
67. Id. at 681; see also id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he State has
interests in teaching high school students how to conduct civil and effective public
discourse and in avoiding disruption of educational school activities.”).
68. Id. at 683 (majority opinion). In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988), the Court observed that “[t]he decision in Fraser rested on the
‘vulgar,’ ‘lewd,’ and ‘plainly offensive’ character of a speech delivered at an official
school assembly rather than on any propensity of the speech to ‘materially disrup[t]
classwork or involv[e] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.’” Id. at
271–72 n.4 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969)).
69. Compare Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 540–
42 (6th Cir. 2001) (interpreting Fraser to apply only to lewd and indecent speech, not
speech involving an objectionable viewpoint such as a Confederate flag), with Boroff
v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Fraser
to apply to plainly offensive language as well as vulgar language).
70. John E. Taylor, Why Student Religious Speech Is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 223,
228 n.18 (2007).
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is inconsistent with the school’s educational mission or conflicts with
71
the fundamental values of public school education.”
As one author has explained, this view undermines Tinker “by
allowing a school to define whatever mission it sees fit and then argue
that whatever speech disagrees with or undermines that mission is
72
offensive.” To prevent Fraser from having the effect of eviscerating
Tinker, the author has argued that plainly offensive speech that
schools may prohibit “should include speech that may not necessarily
rise to the level of obscenity or indecency, but that nonetheless
‘causes a break in the learning process.’ . . . [T]he school must show
not only that the speech was somehow inappropriate for school but
73
also that it caused some disruption of school functioning.” Properly
interpreted, Fraser should have little, if any, bearing in cases involving
student religious or pro-life clothing because such expression does
not entail the kind of lewd or sexually explicit speech that Fraser
74
allows schools to restrict.
And as explained later, the majority
75
opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Morse v. Frederick
76
expressly rejected a broad reading of Fraser.
D. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
77

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court considered “the
extent to which educators may exercise editorial control over the
contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s
78
journalism curriculum.”
A high school principal withheld two
79
articles for publication in the school-sponsored student newspaper.
The newspaper was written and edited by a Journalism II class, but
80
the school maintained ultimate editorial control over its contents.
One deleted article involved three students’ experiences with

71. Sarah Tope Reise, Comment, “Just Say No” to Pro-Drug and Alcohol Student
Speech: The Constitutionality of School Prohibitions of Student Speech Promoting Drug and
Alcohol Use, 57 EMORY L.J. 1259, 1279 (2008).
72. Id. at 1289.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. See K.D. ex rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005
WL 2175166, at *5–7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (explaining that a student’s shirt that
condemned abortion constituted protected speech because the clothing was not
obscene and did not disrupt the school environment).
75. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
76. See infra notes 109–113 and accompanying text (noting that in Morse both the
majority opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion endorse a more limited view
of Fraser).
77. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
78. Id. at 262.
79. Id. at 263–64.
80. Id. at 263.
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81

The principal believed that the references to sexual
pregnancy.
activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger
readers and was also concerned that the pregnant students might be
82
identifiable from the article’s text.
The other article discussed
divorce’s impact on students and included one student’s critical
83
remarks about her father. The principal believed that the father
mentioned in the divorce article should be able to respond but there
was not sufficient time to alter the article before the newspaper was
84
published.
In discussing Tinker’s application to the case at hand, the Court
noted the key difference between the question considered in Tinker
of “whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate
particular student speech” and the question raised in the instant case
of “whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to
85
promote particular student speech.” The Court observed that:
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a
student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises. The latter question concerns educators’ authority over
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
86
school.

The Court declined to apply the Tinker standard to the case at
87
hand or classify the newspaper as a “public forum,” instead holding
that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
88
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” The Court
stated:
[A] school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or
producer of a school play “disassociate itself,” not only from speech
that would “substantially interfere with [its] work . . . or impinge
upon the rights of other students,” but also from speech that is, for
example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched,

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 263–64.
85. Id. at 270.
86. Id. at 270–71.
87. Id. at 270 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
88. Id. at 273.
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biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for
89
immature audiences.

In addition, it noted that “[a] school must also retain the authority to
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived
to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct
otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social
90
order.’”
The Court upheld the school’s exercise of editorial
discretion in the case at hand, stating “we cannot reject as
unreasonable Principal Reynolds’s conclusion that neither the
pregnancy article nor the divorce article was suitable for publication
91
in Spectrum.”
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
acknowledged in his dissenting opinion that “student speech in the
noncurricular context is less likely to disrupt materially any legitimate
92
pedagogical purpose.”
However, Justice Brennan expressed his
concern that affording schools unduly broad authority to censor
student expression that contradicts their educational missions would
have grave consequences for student speech rights. He noted that
“[a] student who responds to a political science teacher’s question
with the retort, ‘socialism is good,’ subverts the school’s inculcation
93
of the message that capitalism is better.” Furthermore, he noted
that “public educators must accommodate some student expression
even if it offends them or offers views or values that contradict those
94
the school wishes to inculcate.”
Hazelwood has minimal relevance to the issue of expression through
student clothing because no person could reasonably believe that the
message a student conveys through clothing “bear[s] the imprimatur
95
of the school.”
However, Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion
serves as a reminder that schools do not have carte blanche to censor
student expression that presents a viewpoint that conflicts with the
96
school’s own message.
89. Id. at 271 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 272 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 276.
92. Id. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 279.
94. Id. at 280.
95. Id. at 271 (majority opinion); see also id. at 270–71 (distinguishing between
student speech that is a “student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the
school premises” and “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and
other expressive activities that . . . might reasonably [be] perceived[d] . . . as part of
the school curriculum”).
96. See id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stressing that “mere incompatibility
with the school’s pedagogical message” does not permit a school to restrict a
student’s speech).
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E. Morse v. Frederick
97

In Morse v. Frederick, a high school allowed students to leave class
to observe the Olympic Torch Relay as it proceeded along a street in
98
front of the school. The school treated the occasion as a schoolsponsored event similar to a field trip and teachers monitored the
99
students’ behavior. “As the torchbearers and camera crews passed
by, Frederick and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the
100
phrase: ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.’”
The principal interpreted the
banner to encourage illegal drug use in violation of school policy and
101
told the student to take it down.
The Supreme Court held that “schools may take steps to safeguard
those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use. We conclude that the
school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment by
confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending the student
102
responsible for it.” The Court observed that, while “[t]he message
on Frederick’s banner [was] cryptic,” it was reasonable for the
principal to conclude that it promoted illegal drug use (rather than
103
any political or religious message).
The Court reviewed previous cases that established that “the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not
104
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”
and that the rights of students “must be ‘applied in light of the
105
special characteristics of the school environment.’” After reviewing
106
its previous student speech cases, the Court emphasized that
“deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed,
107
perhaps compelling’ interest.”
The Court declared that “[t]he
‘special characteristics of the school environment’ and the
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as
108
promoting illegal drug use.”

97. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
98. Id. at 2622.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2622–23.
102. Id. at 2622.
103. Id. at 2624–25.
104. Id. at 2622 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986)).
105. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
106. Id. at 2625–27 (outlining the holdings of Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood).
107. Id. at 2628 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 2629 (citations omitted).
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Importantly, the Court rejected the school’s expansive view of
Fraser:
Petitioners urge us to adopt the broader rule that Frederick’s
speech is proscribable because it is plainly “offensive” as that term
is used in Fraser. We think this stretches Fraser too far; that case
should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under
some definition of “offensive.” After all, much political and religious
109
speech might be perceived as offensive to some.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote a concurring
opinion that stated their view that the majority opinion applied to
110
situations where student speech advocates illegal drug use.
Moreover, the majority opinion “provides no support for any
restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting
on any political or social issue, including speech on issues such as ‘the
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal
111
use.’”
Justice Alito pointed out that the Court rejected “the broad
argument . . . that the First Amendment permits public school
officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s
112
‘educational mission.’” Justice Alito further observed:
The “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by the
elected and appointed public officials with authority over the
schools and by the school administrators and faculty. As a result,
some public schools have defined their educational missions as
including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are
held by the members of these groups.
. . . The “educational mission” argument would give public
school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and
social issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed.
The argument, therefore, strikes at the very heart of the First
113
Amendment.

Justice Breyer wrote separately to express his concern that, “while
the [Court’s] holding is theoretically limited to speech promoting
the use of illegal drugs, it could in fact authorize further viewpoint114
based restrictions.” Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that
115
was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
The dissent

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 2637 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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116

characterized the banner’s “oblique” drug reference as one “that
117
Justice
was never meant to persuade anyone to do anything.”
Stevens declared that “the First Amendment protects student speech
if the message itself neither violates a permissible rule nor expressly
118
advocates conduct that is illegal and harmful to students.”
In the
dissenters’ view, the principal’s decision to require the student to
take the banner down was based on disagreement with the speaker’s
119
pro-drug viewpoint
which violated the “‘bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment . . . that the Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
120
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’”
Justice Stevens stated, “While I find it hard to believe the Court
would support punishing Frederick for flying a ‘WINE SiPS 4 JESUS’
banner—which could quite reasonably be construed either as a
protected religious message or as a pro-alcohol message—the
121
breathtaking sweep of its opinion suggests it would.”
The dissent
declared that the First Amendment provides vigorous protection for
unpopular viewpoints, noting that, “[i]n the national debate about a
serious issue, it is the expression of the minority’s viewpoint that most
122
demands the protection of the First Amendment.”
Much of the legal commentary discussing Morse has declared that
the decision signals a continued narrowing of student speech rights.
One scholar has stated that, “despite the [Morse] Court’s apparent
confidence in the limited scope of its ruling, this decision is likely to
significantly increase the ability of schools to impose content-based
123
restrictions on student speech.”
Another author has highlighted
the fact that “Morse did not foreclose the possibility that the Court’s
student speech cases can be read together to permit some viewpoint
124
discrimination.” Moreover, many scholars believe that “schools and
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2644.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2645–46.
120. Id. at 2645 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
121. Id. at 2650.
122. Id. at 2651 (citations omitted).
123. Joanna Nairn, Recent Development, Free Speech 4 Students? Morse v. Frederick
and the Inculcation of Values in Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 239, 239 (2008).
124. Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students’ Religious Speech and Viewpoint
Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 187, 220 (2007); see also Brannon P. Denning &
Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech,
35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 862–63 (2008) (“Morse compounds the problem by
creating a viewpoint-based exception, not merely a content-based one: Only speech
that encourages or celebrates the use of illegal drugs is punished; speech that
denigrates drug use (‘BONG HITS R 4 LOSERS’?) is presumably permissible.”);
Nairn, supra note 123, at 256 (“Absent the healthy fear of viewpoint discrimination

1260

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1243

courts will have wide latitude not only in deciding how and when to
apply Frederick to student drug-related speech, but also in deciding
what other viewpoints are simply outside a student’s right to freedom
125
of expression.” For example, one scholar has noted:
Nothing in the Court’s decision presents itself as a means to
differentiate pro-drug speech from other unpopular speech . . .
such as speech that glorifies guns, extols alcohol consumption, or
encourages reckless driving. . . .
. . . [S]ome leeway may exist for lower courts to extend the
ruling in Morse to topics of speech such as smoking, gambling,
sexual activity, and teenage pregnancy—activities that are not
illegal for the population as a whole, as drug use is, but that many
126
people would view as harmful to students.

A better view, however, is that “Morse appears to be a case about
127
illegal drug use and nothing more” and, as such, its “implications
for the issue of viewpoint discrimination in general are (at least in the
128
short term) quite limited.”
In addition, the Morse Court rejected
129
Commentators
some of the school district’s broadest arguments.
have pointed out that the Morse Court squarely rejected the school
board’s arguments that Fraser should be read to apply to any
“offensive” speech and that schools should be able to bar expression
130
that contradicts any “educational mission.”
demonstrated in Tinker, the ruling in Morse could easily extend far outside the starkly
pro-illegal drug messages with which the Court was concerned.”).
125. The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 296, 296
(2007); see also Nairn, supra note 123, at 256 (“The chilling effect that this decision
will have upon students is likely to be profound, as it will embolden school
administrators who wish to engage in increasingly restrictive speech regulation and
will encourage lower courts to be more reluctant to strike down such policies.”).
126. Nairn, supra note 123, at 252; see also Denning & Taylor, supra note 124, at
865 (“[A]ll manner of speech encouraging or celebrating activities that are physically
dangerous—from driving fast to having sex—is potentially the subject of a similar
categorical exclusion.”); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 125,
at 304 (noting that Justice Alito “issued a conclusory statement: ‘[I]llegal drug use
presents a grave and in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students.’
Perhaps; but so do gun violence, unprotected sexual intercourse, traffic accidents
involving inexperienced drivers, anorexia, and obesity—to take some of the more
popularly known examples” (citation omitted)).
127. Taylor, supra note 70, at 228 n.18.
128. Id. at 228.
129. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) (refusing to endorse the
school district’s argument that Frederick’s banner should be banned as being
“plainly ‘offensive’” speech because such a reading is inconsistent with the Court’s
precedent in Fraser).
130. See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 124, at 882; see also Stephen Kanter,
Bong Hits 4 Jesus as a Cautionary Tale of Two Cities, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 61, 92
(2008) (explaining that the Morse majority “flatly reject[ed] Dean Starr’s enormously
broad argument on behalf of petitioners that the Court should sanction the power of
school officials to censor student speech simply because it is ‘offensive.’” (citation
omitted)); id. at 94 (“Justices Alito and Kennedy categorically rejected another broad
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One commentator has stated that Morse does not provide a green
light for schools to censor religious t-shirts, even those deemed to be
“aggressive” in nature: “It would be difficult to find that the aggressive
religious statements on students’ T-shirts create the same sort of
actual physical danger to the overwhelming number of public school
131
students across the country as illegal drug use does.”
Morse simply established that schools need not tolerate advocacy of
illegal behavior; the opinion does not allow for restriction of
132
religious, political, or unpopular speech.
As such, Tinker remains
the most relevant case in situations involving school censorship of
133
religious or pro-life clothing.
II. LOWER COURT CASES DEALING WITH “CONTROVERSIAL”
RELIGIOUS OR PRO-LIFE STUDENT SPEECH
As discussed in the previous Section, the Supreme Court’s cases
dealing with student speech have established a general framework
while leaving important questions unanswered. Lower courts have
used different modes of analysis—and have reached different
results—in applying Supreme Court precedent in cases involving
student religious, or pro-life, clothing. This Section reviews several
leading lower court cases and argues for expansive protection of
student speech.
A. Cases Providing Broad Protection for “Controversial” Religious
or Pro-Life Student Speech
134

Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education, K.D. ex rel.
135
Dibble v. Fillmore Central School District, and Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State
136
College Area School District provide broad protection of student
speech and, in our view, present a proper reading of Tinker and
Fraser.
censorial argument advanced by counsel for the principal, the school board, and the
United States. . . . [The argument] would have permitted school officials to censor
student speech whenever it interfered with the school’s self-defined ‘educational
mission.’” (citation omitted)).
131. Bowman, supra note 124, at 221.
132. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629 (explaining that public school districts are not
permitted to proscribe speech merely because it is offensive, since protected political
and religious speech could be potentially offensive).
133. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969)
(describing the armbands that the students wore as a form of political expression no
different than a political discussion that could not be limited unless it significantly
disrupted the school’s work).
134. 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
135. No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).
136. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
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Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education
Nixon involved a Christian middle school student, James Nixon,
who wore a t-shirt to school that said “INTOLERANT . . . Jesus
said . . . I am the way, the truth and the life. John 14:6” on the front
and the following on the back: “Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a lie!
137
Abortion is murder! Some issues are just black and white!” School
officials would not allow him to continue wearing the shirt, citing a
policy prohibiting student attire that “disrupts the educational
138
process” or is “suggestive, obscene, or offensive.”
The court stated that “[t]here is no evidence that James’ T-shirt
caused any disruption at the school. . . . He has worn other shirts to
school that contain religious messages such as ‘WWJD’ referring to
139
the phrase ‘What Would Jesus Do?’”
The court issued an
injunction forbidding school officials from preventing James from
wearing his t-shirt “[a]s long as the shirt is not substantially disrupting
or interfering with the school’s activities and an imminent and
140
substantial disruption is not likely to occur.”
The school argued that “James does not have a constitutional right
to wear the shirt to school since its message is plainly offensive (under
141
Fraser) and invades on the rights of others (under Tinker).”
After
reviewing Fraser, the court concluded that “a school may prohibit
vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech since it
142
undermines a school’s basic educational mission.”
After discussing how other courts had applied or declined to apply
143
Fraser in student speech cases, the court rejected the school’s
interpretation of Fraser, stating:
1.

Fraser and its progeny of cases all deal with speech that is offensive
because of the manner in which it is conveyed. Examples are
speech containing vulgar language, graphic sexual innuendos, or
137. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 967.
138. Id. at 968 (citation omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 975.
141. Id. at 970.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 970–71 (citing Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465,
471 (6th Cir. 2000), which upheld a school’s refusal to allow Marilyn Manson t-shirts
due to the singer’s support of drug use, suicide, and murder in his lyrics; Smith ex rel.
Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987, 997 (E.D. Mich. 2003),
which upheld discipline for student commentary about a school’s tardy policy that
included references to sexual activity of school administrators; Barber ex rel. Barber v.
Dearborn Pub. Sch., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 856 (E.D. Mich. 2003), which held that
Fraser was inapplicable in a case involving a t-shirt displaying a photo of President
George W. Bush with the phrase “International Terrorist”; and Bragg v. Swanson, 371
F. Supp. 2d 814, 823 (W.D.W. Va. 2005), which held that Fraser was inapplicable in a
case involving a Confederate flag shirt).
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speech that promotes suicide, drugs, alcohol, or murder. Rather
than being concerned with the actual content of what is being
conveyed, the Fraser justification for regulating speech is more
concerned with the plainly offensive manner in which it is
144
conveyed.

In addition, the court held that “[s]peech that contains a
potentially offensive political viewpoint is not included in this
145
category of regulated expression.”
In other words, where the
alleged offensive nature of expression stems from the viewpoints
conveyed rather than the manner in which the expression occurs,
146
restrictions on such expression are governed by Tinker, not Fraser.
Regarding Tinker’s applicability to the case at hand, the court
observed that there was no history of disorder in the school, and the
mere fact that Muslims, homosexuals, and those who have had
abortions at the school may be offended by the shirt was insufficient
147
to justify the school’s actions.
In addition, the court rejected the school’s claim that the t-shirt
148
The court
was an “invasion on the rights of others” under Tinker.
stated that it was “not aware of a single decision that has focused on
that language in Tinker as the sole basis for upholding a school’s
149
regulation of student speech.” The court concluded that “invading
on the rights of other students entails invading on other students’
150
rights to be secure and to be let alone.”
The court stated that,
“[j]ust as in Tinker, there is no evidence that James’ silent, passive
expression of opinion interfered with the work of Sheridan Middle
151
School or collided with the rights of other students to be let alone.”
Nixon’s robust protection of controversial student speech is
consistent with both Tinker and Fraser. The student’s t-shirt conveyed,
in admittedly strong terms, his beliefs about Christianity, Islam,
152
The t-shirt was likely to spark
abortion, and homosexuality.
conversation or debate from time to time as other students expressed
their agreement or disagreement with his religious, moral, or

144. Id. at 971 (citations omitted).
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 973. The court continued, noting that “[i]f the mere fact that other
students will likely find a message offensive justified a school’s regulation of
expression, then a student’s right to freely express himself would be greatly
diminished.” Id. at 973 n.11.
148. Id. at 974.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying note 137 (describing Nixon’s t-shirt).
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153

political views. However, nothing about the t-shirt was so inherently
likely to incite substantial disruption or violence to justify the school’s
154
decision to censor it.
The appropriate response for the school
would have been to ensure that students who disagreed with the tshirt’s message were permitted to express their own countermessages. This response is consistent with the principle that
“[a]chieving free expression requires an open marketplace in which
citizens are susceptible to varied viewpoints” and that “schools are
parts of that marketplace, with students entitled to the privileges of
155
citizenry.”
The court in Nixon properly rejected the view that Tinker permits
high schools to censor student expression due to the perceived
“psychological vulnerability” of students even in the absence of
156
substantial disruption of the school environment.
Such a broad
censorship authority would be “an affront to our nation’s historical
commitment to a freedom of speech that absorbs the risk of
157
provoking debate, disturbance, and personal offense.”
While one
author has argued that the District Court in Nixon “did not take
158
affronts to identity interest seriously,” the fact remains that Tinker
provides robust protection for student speech that is not likely to
159
cause substantial disruption.
A large amount of student religious,
pro-life, or political speech could be interpreted as an affront to the
identity of other students with different belief systems, but that is no
160
justification for censoring student speech. High school students—
many of whom are seventeen or eighteen years old—do not have a
153. See Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (acknowledging that certain groups,
including “Muslims, homosexuals, and those who [had] had abortions,” might have
been offended by the t-shirt).
154. See id. (finding that the “mere fact that [certain] groups . . . could find the
shirt’s message offensive, falls well short of the Tinker standard for reasonably
anticipat[ing] a disruption of school activities” that would justify banning the t-shirt).
155. Russomanno, supra note 46, at 375–76.
156. Amanda L. Houle, Note, From T-Shirts to Teaching: May Public Schools
Constitutionally Regulate Antihomosexual Speech?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2477, 2501 (2008)
(citing Richard Fossey et al., Harper v. Poway Unified School District: Schools Can
Ban Demeaning Speech Toward Vulnerable Students Without Offending the First Amendment,
211 EDUC. L. REP. 559, 570–72 (2006)).
157. Id. (citing Fossey et al., supra note 156, at 570–71).
158. Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 317, 368 (2007).
159. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510–11 (1969)
(noting that the school singled out the students who opposed the Vietnam War, the
Court stated that “the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least
without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible”).
160. See Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206–07 (3d
Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that prohibiting speech simply because a listener may
find it offensive is not constitutionally permissible).
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“right” to be sheltered from religious, pro-life, or political expression
that may offend them, just as they will not have such a right once they
161
leave school.
K.D. ex rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Central School District
There are few reported opinions that deal with student pro-life
162
shirts, and cases involving pro-life literature distribution raise
different issues than pro-life clothing cases and have produced
163
conflicting results. In the leading case on pro-life clothing, K.D. ex
164
rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Central School District, the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York upheld the First
Amendment right of a high school sophomore to wear a pro-life
165
t-shirt to school.
The front of the t-shirt stated in large capital
letters: “ABORTION IS HOMICIDE,” while the back of the shirt
contained several phrases: “You will not silence my message”; “You
will not mock my God”; “You will stop killing my generation”; and
166
“Rock for Life!”
2.

161. See Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Education: Between Two
Democracies, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 999, 1015–17 (2008) (discussing the Court’s
treatment of the Establishment and Free Speech Clauses and arguing that religious
speech will likely be protected while more controversial speech will likely not be
protected).
162. In Heinkel ex rel. Heinkel v. School Board, the Eleventh Circuit noted in an
unpublished opinion that a middle school allowed students to wear a t-shirt that read
“Day of Remembrance, 45 Million lost to abortion since 1973, Remembering in
silence.” on the front and “We give a voice to those who cannot speak. We stand for
those who never could. We remember the 1/3 of our generation lost.” on the back.
No. 05-13813, 2006 WL 2417296, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (per curiam). The
court held that the school’s refusal to allow a student to distribute pro-life literature
to her classmates was justified by a reasonable belief that substantial disruption could
occur. Id. at *3–5. The court found it significant that the students in the middle
school ranged from age eleven to fourteen and the school did not include abortion
or birth control as part of the curriculum. Id. Importantly, however, the court
invalidated the school’s written policy, which prohibited the distribution of all
religious or political literature, stating that the ban was “a content-based restriction
unsupported by a reasonable belief of the School Board that all such expression
would create substantial disruption in the Lee County schools.” Id. at *3.
163. Compare M.A.L. ex rel. M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841, 847–50 (6th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a middle school does not have to show that unregulated literature
distribution would cause substantial disruption before it may impose content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions in a case involving pro-life literature), with
Raker v. Frederick County Pub. Sch., 470 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640 (W.D. Va. 2007)
(holding that a high school’s policy limiting student distribution of literature was
invalid because there was no evidence that substantial disruption would otherwise
occur in a case involving pro-life literature).
164. No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).
165. See id. at *6 (applying the Tinker standard based on the content of the t-shirt,
the court determined that the school failed to show that K.D’s t-shirt interfered with
or disturbed school activities).
166. Id. at *1.
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The Principal told the student that the shirt violated the school’s
dress code because it was inappropriate and interfered with the
167
Three female students complained to a
educational process.
168
teacher that they were “upset” by the t-shirt. Because the school’s
dress code mandated suspension for students who refused to modify
169
attire found to be in violation of the dress code, the student was
170
forced to stop wearing the t-shirt out of fear of a suspension.
In considering whether the school had violated the student’s
171
freedom of speech, the court reviewed Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood.
The court held that the student’s attire “is not . . . a school-sponsored
expressive activity, and thus the Hazelwood standard does not apply to
172
this case.”
The court also held that the school’s objection to the
t-shirt was based on the content of the message and, therefore,
173
The court
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard applied.
explained:
K.D.’s expression of his pro-life message was political speech. . . .
Although defendants argue that the message is “aggressive,” there
is no evidence showing that K.D. did anything more than walk
through the hallways and attend his classes while wearing the Tshirt. . . . Like the Tinker students, he merely went about his
174
ordained rounds during the school day.

The court further explained that the fact that students at the
school may find the shirt very offensive, including students who have
175
had an abortion, is “insufficient to satisfy the Tinker standard.” The
court added that student complaints about the content of the t-shirt
“simply do not rise to the level of a ‘disruption’ much less a ‘material
and substantial interference’ with K.D.’s classes or the overall
administration of the school,” and also noted, “[c]ertainly students
do not have the right not to be ‘upset’ when confronted with a
176
viewpoint with which they disagree.” As such, the court granted the
177
student’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
The opinion in K.D. stands for the proposition that censorship of a
pro-life message is not justified simply because a student may find it
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *2 n.6.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *6 n.12 (citations omitted).
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
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While the subject of
to be “offensive,” or may be upset by it.
abortion is certainly controversial, it is no more controversial than
the Vietnam War at issue in Tinker, yet the Court upheld the students’
179
right to wear an armband in protest.
The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “[m]en and women of good conscience can
disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the
profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a
180
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.” Indeed, a pro-life t-shirt is a
peaceful, non-disruptive way for students to express their viewpoint
on “the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a
181
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.”
Those who disagree with a
student’s pro-life viewpoint should be mindful of the Barnette Court’s
statement that “freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
182
matter much” and that “scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual” is a core aspect of our system of
183
government.
Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State College Area School District
184
In Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State College Area School District, Christian
185
students challenged a school district’s “anti-harassment” policy.
The students believed that the policy prohibited them from
distributing religious literature that conveyed the belief that
186
homosexuality is a sin.
The policy defined prohibited harassment
as “verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or perceived
race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student’s
educational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
3.

178. See id. at *6 (recognizing that, while a school can prohibit student speech if it
interferes with the rights of other students, there is no right to be free from differing
viewpoints).
179. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 n.4, 513
(1969) (observing that at the time of the armband prohibition, “debate over the Viet
Nam war had become vehement in many localities” and later holding that the
Constitution protects a student’s right to engage controversial issues so long as
school activities are not disrupted).
180. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
181. See id.
182. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
183. Id. at 637.
184. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
185. Id. at 203–04.
186. See id. at 203, 206 n.6, 207 (noting that anti-discrimination laws regulate
speech based on content and viewpoint and require the “most exacting First
Amendment scrutiny”).
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187

According to the policy, harassment
offensive environment.”
includes “any unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct which
offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because of any of the
188
[listed] characteristics.”
Writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, then-Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Alito stated that the
189
school’s policy was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.
Judge Alito rejected the district court’s conclusion that the antiharassment policy went no further than federal and state
190
anti-harassment law.
The court observed that “there is . . . no
question that the free speech clause protects a wide variety of speech
that listeners may consider deeply offensive, including statements
that impugn another’s race or national origin or that denigrate
191
religious beliefs.”
In addition, “‘[h]arassing’ or discriminatory
speech, although evil and offensive, may be used to communicate
ideas or emotions that nevertheless implicate First Amendment
192
protections.”
The court took issue with a provision of the policy that prohibited
disparaging speech that was directed at a person’s values, stating:
[T]he Policy strikes at the heart of moral and political discourse—
the lifeblood of constitutional self government (and democratic
education) and the core concern of the First Amendment. That
speech about “values” may offend is not cause for its prohibition,
but rather the reason for its protection: “a principal ‘function of
free speech under our system of government is to invite
193
dispute.’”

The court declared that, “[a]s subsequent federal cases have made
clear, Tinker requires a specific and significant fear of disruption, not
194
just some remote apprehension of disturbance.”
In addition, “the
187. Id. at 202.
188. Id. at 202–03.
189. See id. at 215 (reasoning that the school’s policy was overbroad because it
purported to restrict any unwelcome verbal conduct and the Supreme Court has
continually held that “the mere fact that someone might take offense at the content
of speech is not sufficient justification for prohibiting it”).
190. Id. at 204–06.
191. Id. at 206.
192. Id. at 209.
193. Id. at 210 (citation omitted).
194. Id. at 211. The court then highlighted a variety of cases where a fear of
disruption was unfounded. See id. at 211–12 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville Sch.
Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992), which held that the school failed to show
that “SCAB” buttons worn to protest replacement teachers during a strike were
“inherently disruptive” to school activities, Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist.,
976 F. Supp. 659, 667 (S.D. Tex. 1997), where a school provided “insufficient
evidence of actual disruption” in prohibiting a Catholic student from wearing a
rosary because some gang members had worn rosaries as their identifying symbols,
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mere desire to avoid ‘discomfort’ or ‘unpleasantness’ is not enough
to justify restricting student speech under Tinker. However, if a
school can point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—
especially one based on past incidents arising out of similar speech—
195
the restriction may pass constitutional muster.”
In this case, the school could not demonstrate that “the Policy’s
restrictions are necessary to prevent substantial disruption or
interference with the work of the school or the rights of other
196
students.”
While the provision prohibiting speech that would
“‘substantially interfer[e] with a student’s educational performance’
197
may satisfy the Tinker standard,” the provision prohibiting speech
that “creat[es] an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment” was
198
overly broad. The court noted that “[t]he precise scope of Tinker’s
‘interference with the rights of others’ language is unclear; at least
one court has opined that it covers only independently tortious
speech like libel, slander or intentional infliction of emotional
199
distress.” The court explained that “it is certainly not enough that
the speech is merely offensive to some listener,” as “much ‘core’
200
political and religious speech” falls into that category. Finally, the
court stated that “[a]lthough [the school district] correctly asserts
that it has a compelling interest in promoting an educational
environment that is safe and conducive to learning, it fails to provide
any particularized reason as to why it anticipates substantial
disruption from the broad swath of student speech prohibited under
201
the Policy.”
While Nixon, K.D., and Saxe are not the only cases that have upheld
the right of students to engage in controversial religious or pro-life
202
speech, they illustrate a proper application of Tinker. In the context
and Clark v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. 116, 120 (N.D. Tex. 1992), which
determined that a school failed to demonstrate material or substantial disruption of
school functions caused by distribution of religious tracts).
195. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 212 (citing West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358
(10th Cir. 2000)).
196. Id. at 216.
197. Id. at 217 (alteration in original).
198. Id. (alteration in original).
199. Id. (citing Slotterback ex rel. Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp.
280, 289 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1991)).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. In Chambers v. Babbitt, the court upheld a high school student’s right to wear a
shirt to school that said “Straight Pride” on the front and had a symbol of a man and
a woman holding hands on the back. 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072–74 (D. Minn.
2001). The court rejected the school’s contention that the student’s expression
could be restricted due to unrelated racial incidents and an incident of vandalism of
a gay student’s car. Id. at 1071–72. The court declared:
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of the Vietnam War, the Tinker Court was keenly aware of the need to
protect “controversial” student expression from censorship and
expressly held that a student “may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without
‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without
203
Tinker’s protection of
colliding with the rights of others.”
“controversial” expression would be rendered meaningless if school
authorities could cite the mere existence of a controversy as the basis
204
for suppressing speech.
B. Cases Providing Moderate or Minimal Protection for “Controversial”
Religious or Pro-Life Student Speech
While the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian
205
Prairie School District provides moderate protection for controversial
student religious expression, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harper ex
206
rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School District provides schools with broad
leeway to restrict student speech and poses a substantial threat to the
future of student religious and pro-life expression.
Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District
In Nuxoll, the Seventh Circuit upheld a high school student’s right
to wear a shirt that said “Be Happy, Not Gay,” while belittling the
207
importance of protecting student speech.
Some students at the
school participated in a “Day of Silence” event that sought to
promote tolerance for homosexuals by remaining silent throughout
208
the day and wearing expressive t-shirts.
On the following day,
1.

Maintaining a school community of tolerance includes the tolerance of such
viewpoints as expressed by “Straight Pride.” While the sentiment behind the
“Straight Pride” message appears to be one of intolerance, the responsibility
remains with the school and its community to maintain an environment
open to diversity and to educate and support its students as they confront
ideas different from their own.
Id. at 1073.
203. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
204. See id. at 512–14 (recognizing that interpersonal communication is an
important part of the educational process and inferring that controversial issues
further the educational process by providing a platform for students to form
opinions, express those opinions, and learn to communicate with one another).
205. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
206. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
207. See Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 676 (holding that the student’s shirt could not be
linked to any harassment and was highly unlikely to “poison the educational
atmosphere”).
208. Id. at 670.
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students who objected to homosexual behavior participated in a “Day
of Truth” event by wearing shirts with messages such as “Day of
209
One student’s t-shirt
Truth . . . The Truth cannot be silenced.”
said, “Be Happy, Not Gay” on the back, but the school inked out the
210
“Not Gay” language. The school considered “Be Happy, Not Gay”
to be a derogatory comment on a particular sexual orientation in
violation of a school rule forbidding “derogatory comments . . . that
refer to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or
211
disability.”
A student who wanted to wear a “Be Happy, Not Gay” shirt to
school challenged the school’s policy on its face as well as its
212
application to his particular shirt. He argued that he had the right
to wear any t-shirt that condemns homosexual behavior that does not
amount to “fighting words” (for example, a shirt stating
213
“homosexuals go to Hell” could be prohibited).
Judge Posner’s
majority opinion argued for the broad authority of schools to
regulate controversial student speech:
A heavy federal constitutional hand on the regulation of student
speech by school authorities would make little sense. The
contribution that kids can make to the marketplace in ideas and
opinions is modest and a school’s countervailing interest in
protecting its students from offensive speech by their classmates is
214
undeniable.

The court held that the school’s policy was reasonable in light of
the fact that “[p]eople are easily upset by comments about their race,
sex, etc., including their sexual orientation, because for most people
these are major components of their personal identity—none more
215
so than a sexual orientation that deviates from the norm.”
The court found the free speech interests at stake to be minimal,
stating that “uninhibited high-school student hallway debate over
sexuality—whether carried out in the form of dueling T-shirts,
dueling banners, dueling pamphlets, annotated Bibles, or soapbox
oratory—[is not] an essential preparation for the exercise of the
216
franchise.” In addition, the court stated that
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 671; see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting
that speech can be limited when it falls within a few narrow categories, including
insulting or fighting words that are reasonably likely to incite a breach of the peace).
214. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 671.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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[w]e foresee a deterioration in the school’s ability to educate its
students if negative comments on homosexuality by students like
Nuxoll who believe that the Bible is the word of God to be
interpreted literally incite negative comments on the Bible by
students who believe either that there is no God or that the Bible
should be interpreted figuratively. Mutual respect and forbearance
enforced by the school may well be essential to the maintenance of
217
a minimally decorous atmosphere for learning.

Importantly, the court rejected the school’s argument based on
Tinker’s “rights of others” language, noting that “people do not have a
legal right to prevent criticism of their beliefs or for that matter their
218
way of life.”
Additionally, the court observed that “[t]here is no
indication that the negative comments that the plaintiff wants to
make about homosexuals or homosexuality names or otherwise
219
targets an individual or is defamatory.” Tinker “was a quite different
case from this” because, in the court’s view, the school in Tinker “was
discriminating against a particular point of view, namely opposition
220
to the Vietnam war expressed by the wearing of black armbands,”
because “ban[ning] all discussion of the Vietnam war would in reality
have been taking sides—would have delighted the government—
because the debate over the war was started, maintained, and
221
escalated by the war’s opponents.”
The court concluded that a school is not “required to prove that
unless the speech at issue is forbidden serious consequences will in
fact ensue. . . . It is enough for the school to present ‘facts which
might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial
222
disruption.’” The court noted that “one of the concerns expressed
by the Supreme Court in Morse was with the psychological effects of
223
drugs” and it stated: “[i]magine the psychological effects if the
plaintiff wore a T-shirt on which was written ‘blacks have lower IQs
224
than whites’ or ‘a woman’s place is in the home.’”
The court
concluded that schools may regulate speech that school officials
believe “will lead to a decline in students’ test scores, an upsurge in
truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school—symptoms therefore of
225
substantial disruption.”
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 672.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 673 (citation omitted).
Id. at 674 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628–29 (2007)).
Id.
Id.
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While the court noted that the school’s policy would be
problematic “if the school understood ‘derogatory comments’ to
embrace any statement that could be construed by the very sensitive
226
as critical of one of the protected group identities,” the court stated
that “high-school students are not adults, schools are not public
meeting halls, children are in school to be taught by adults rather
than to practice attacking each other with wounding words, and
school authorities have a protective relationship and responsibility to
227
all the students.”
Regarding the policy’s applicability to the “Be Happy, Not Gay”
t-shirt, the court stated that “[o]ne cannot even be certain that it is a
‘derogatory’ comment; for ‘not gay’ is a synonym for ‘straight,’ yet
the school has told us that it would not object to a T-shirt that said
228
‘Be Happy, Be Straight.’” The court declared that, while a student
wearing the t-shirt “is expressing disapproval of homosexuality,” its
message “is only tepidly negative; ‘derogatory’ or ‘demeaning’ seems
229
too strong a characterization.”
In addition, while there had been
past incidents of harassment of homosexual students at the school, “it
is highly speculative that allowing the plaintiff to wear a T-shirt that
says ‘Be Happy, Not Gay’ would have even a slight tendency to
provoke such incidents, or for that matter to poison the educational
230
atmosphere.”
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rovner criticized the majority’s
dismissive attitude toward student speech:
Youth are often the vanguard of social change. Anyone who thinks
otherwise has not been paying attention to the civil rights
movement, the women’s rights movement, the anti-war protests for
Vietnam and Iraq, and the [2008] presidential primaries where the
youth voice and the youth vote are having a substantial impact.
And now youth are leading a broad, societal change in attitude
towards homosexuals, forming alliances among lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgendered (“LGBT”) and heterosexual students to
discuss issues of importance related to sexual orientation. They
231
have initiated a dialogue in which Nuxoll wishes to participate.

Moreover, Judge Rovner observed that the young adults, whom the
majority dismissed as “kids” and “children,” will soon be eligible to
vote, to marry and to serve in the military, among other important
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id. at 674–75.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 676.
Id.
Id. at 677–78 (Rovner, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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232

rights and duties that adults hold. Judge Rovner further stated, “I
233
view this as a simple case,” and explained that “[t]he school district
has ‘not demonstrate[d] any facts which might reasonably have led
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
234
interference with school activities.’”
Judge Rovner disagreed with the majority’s characterization of
Tinker as a case about viewpoint discrimination, stating that “[i]t is
more appropriately characterized as a discussion about subject matter
discrimination, although the opinion is not limited to the
circumstance where the school has banned all discussion of a
235
particular subject.”
While considering the language “Be Happy,
236
Not Gay” to be “derogatory” and “disparaging,” Judge Rovner stated
that “it is not the kind of speech that would materially and
237
She continued,
substantially interfere with school activities.”
declaring that “[t]here is a significant difference between expressing
one’s religiously-based disapproval of homosexuality and targeting
LGBT students for harassment. Though probably offensive to most
LGBT students, the former is not likely by itself to create a hostile
238
environment.”
Judge Rovner concluded that “[t]he First
Amendment as interpreted by Tinker is consistent with the school’s
mission to teach by encouraging debate on controversial topics while
also allowing the school to limit the debate when it becomes
substantially disruptive.
Nuxoll’s slogan-adorned t-shirt comes
239
nowhere near that standard.”
Judge Rovner’s concurring opinion is more consistent with Tinker
than Judge Posner’s majority opinion. Judge Posner’s flippant
statement that “[t]he contribution that kids can make to the
240
marketplace in ideas and opinions is modest” was effectively
countered by Judge Rovner’s observation that those “kids” are already
eligible, or soon will be eligible, to exercise the rights of adulthood
241
such as the right to vote, serve in the military, or marry.
Accordingly, student religious and political expression, while often
less sophisticated than that of adults, is nevertheless important in
232. Id. at 677–78 (Rovner, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
233. Id. at 676.
234. Id. at 676–77 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 512–13, 514 (1969)) (alterations in original).
235. Id. at 677.
236. Id. at 678, 679.
237. Id. at 679.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 680.
240. Id. at 671 (majority opinion).
241. Id. at 678 (Rovner, J., concurring).
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helping students learn how to formulate and express their own
opinions as well as respond to the opinions of other students with
242
As Judge Rovner correctly noted, student
which they disagree.
expression of religiously-based disapproval of homosexual behavior
cannot be reflexively labeled as harassment or hate speech that
243
schools may censor in the name of tolerance.
Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School District
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified
244
School District provides schools with broad leeway to restrict student
245
speech and has been the subject of much criticism and debate.
Harper involved a school’s decision to forbid a sophomore student
from wearing a t-shirt that stated “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL
EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” on the front and
246
“HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” on the back.
He wore the
shirt in response to “Day of Silence” activities at the school that
247
promoted tolerance of students with a different sexual orientation.
One year earlier, there had been some altercations at the school
248
during a “Day of Silence” and a subsequent “Straight-Pride Day,”
although it was unclear whether those events had any real
249
relationship to the case at hand.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld the school’s decision to ban the shirt by a two-to-one vote in a
broad-ranging decision that, if followed, would allow schools to
censor virtually any student t-shirt that expresses opposition to
250
homosexuality.
The majority opinion, authored by Judge
Reinhardt, declared: “Perhaps our dissenting colleague believes that
2.

242. But see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (noting
that although students “do not ‘shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate’ . . . the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools
‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings’”
(citations omitted)).
243. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 679 (Rovner, J., concurring) (noting that there is a
difference between harassing students belonging to minority groups and expressing
a religious point of view).
244. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
245. See id. at 1178 (holding that schools may prohibit speech that intrudes upon
the rights of other students).
246. Id. at 1171.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1171–72.
249. Id. at 1194–95 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that the prior year’s
disturbance did not involve Harper and could not be clearly traced to any messages
on a student’s t-shirt).
250. See id. at 1180 (majority opinion) (“[T]he school had a valid and lawful basis
for restricting Harper’s wearing of his T-shirt on the ground that his conduct was
injurious to gay and lesbian students and interfered with their right to learn.”).
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one can condemn homosexuality without condemning homosexuals.
If so, he is wrong. To say that homosexuality is shameful is to say,
251
The majority
necessarily, that gays and lesbians are shameful.”
opinion used many strong terms for its view of the t-shirt’s message
252
253
254
such as “condemning,” “demeaning,” “injurious,” a “verbal
255
256
257
assault[],”
a
“psychological
attack[],”
“derogatory,”
258
259
260
261
“harmful,”
“hateful,”
“homophobic,”
“degrad[ing],”
262
263
“discriminatory,” and “offensive.”
The court took a broad view of Tinker’s statement that public
schools may restrict student speech that “‘intrudes upon . . . the
rights of other students’ or ‘collides with the rights of other students
264
to be secure and to be let alone.’” The court stated:
Harper’s wearing of his T-shirt “collides with the rights of other
students” in the most fundamental way. Public school students who
may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core identifying
characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation, have a
right to be free from such attacks while on school campuses. As
Tinker clearly states, students have the right to “be secure and to be
let alone.” Being secure involves not only freedom from physical
assaults but from psychological attacks that cause young people to
265
question their self-worth and their rightful place in society.

The court held that schools “may prohibit the wearing of T-shirts
on high school campuses and in high school classes that flaunt
demeaning slogans, phrases or aphorisms relating to a core
characteristic of particularly vulnerable students [such as race,
religion, and sexual orientation] and that may cause them significant
266
injury.” The court drew a comparison between Harper’s t-shirt and
“labeling black students inferior” or “wearing T-shirts saying that Jews
251. Id. at 1181.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1175 n.11, 1177, 1178, 1182, 1187 & n.34.
254. Id. at 1180, 1181, 1182 & n.27, 1183, 1185, 1186, 1187 n.34, 1192.
255. Id. at 1178 & n.18, 1179, 1183, 1185.
256. Id. at 1178.
257. Id. at 1180, 1183.
258. Id. at 1181.
259. Id. at 1181, 1182, 1188.
260. Id. at 1186.
261. Id. at 1186 n.32.
262. Id. at 1188.
263. Id. at 1189. The court further stated “[b]ecause we decide Harper’s free
speech claim on the basis of Tinker, we need not consider whether his speech was
‘plainly offensive’ under Fraser.” Id. at 1176 n.14.
264. Id. at 1177 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969)).
265. Id. at 1178 (citations omitted).
266. Id. at 1182.
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are doomed to Hell” and stated that, “[i]f a school permitted its
students to wear shirts reading, ‘Negroes: Go Back To Africa,’ no one
would doubt that the message would be harmful to young black
267
students.”
The court stated that, in pursuit of their educational mission,
“public schools may permit, and even encourage, discussions of
tolerance, equality and democracy without being required to provide
equal time for student or other speech espousing intolerance, bigotry
268
or hatred.” For example, a school “need not permit its students to
wear T-shirts reading, ’Jews Are Christ-Killers’ or ‘All Muslims Are Evil
Doers’” if it holds a “Day of Religious Tolerance,” nor must it allow
swastikas or Confederate flags in response to a “Day of Racial
269
Tolerance.”
The panel tried to limit the scope of its decision, stating, “we
reaffirm the importance of preserving student speech about
controversial issues generally and protecting the bedrock principle
that students ‘may not be confined to the expression of those
270
sentiments that are officially approved.’” For example, the majority
stated that t-shirts that declare “Young Republicans Suck” or “Young
Democrats Suck” or that “denigrate the President, his administration,
or his policies, or otherwise invite political disagreement or debate,
including debates over the war in Iraq, would not fall within the
271
‘rights of others’ Tinker prong.”
Judge Kozinski’s dissenting opinion stated that “[r]econciling
272
Tinker and Fraser is no easy task,” but declared that “the school
authorities have offered no lawful justification for banning Harper’s
273
T-shirt.”
The dissent noted that there was scant evidence showing
any actual or likely disruption caused by Harper’s t-shirt—he wore a
274
similar shirt on the previous day and there was no disruption —and
stated that the vague references to altercations that occurred a year
275
earlier bore little, if any, connection to the case at hand.
The
dissent noted that “discussions [between high school students] can
become heated, but so long as they don’t escalate into violence or the

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 1180–81.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1185–86 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1182 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1193 n.1 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1195–96.
Id. at 1194–95.
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threat of violence, and do not otherwise interfere with school
276
operations, they cause no disruption of the school environment.”
In addition, the dissent took issue with the idea that a school could
deem the promotion of one side of a contentious debate to be part of
its educational mission and then declare student expression with an
277
opposing viewpoint to be inconsistent with the educational process.
Moreover, the dissent acknowledged that
tolerance toward homosexuality and homosexual conduct is
anathema to those who believe that intimate relations among
people of the same sex are immoral or sinful. . . . [A] visible and
highly publicized political action by those on one side of the issue
will provoke those on the other side to express a different point of
278
view, if only to avoid the implication that they agree.

Regarding the “rights of others” language from Tinker, the dissent
stated, “[s]urely, this language is not meant to give state legislatures
the power to define the First Amendment rights of students out of
279
existence by giving others the right not to hear that speech.”
Instead, “[t]he ‘rights of others’ language in Tinker can only refer to
traditional rights, such as those against assault, defamation, invasion
of privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay with the First
280
Amendment is well established.”
The dissent also rejected the
majority’s conclusion that “messages such as Harper’s are so offensive
and demeaning that they interfere with the ability of homosexual
281
students to partake of the educational environment.”
The dissent questioned the scope of the majority’s unprecedented
reading of the “rights of others” language, calling it a “judicial
creation, hatched to deal with the situation before us, but likely to
282
cause innumerable problems in the future.” It stated that
if interference with the learning process is the keystone to the new
right, how come it’s limited to those characteristics that are
associated with minority status? Students may well have their selfesteem bruised by being demeaned for being white or Christian, or
having bad acne or weight problems, or being poor or stupid or
any one of the infinite number of characteristics that will not

276. Id. at 1194.
277. See id. at 1201 (“I have considerable difficulty with giving school authorities
the power to decide that only one side of a controversial topic may be discussed in
the school environment because the opposing point of view is too extreme or
demeaning.”).
278. Id. at 1196.
279. Id. at 1198.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1201.
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qualify them for minority status. Under the rule the majority
announces today, schools would be able to ban t-shirts with pictures
of Mohammed wearing a bomb turban but not those with pictures
of a Crucifix dipped in urine—yet Muslim and Christian children,
283
respectively, may have their learning equally disrupted.

The Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc which led to
284
three strongly-worded concurring and dissenting opinions.
Judge
Reinhardt defended his panel opinion by stating, “[t]he dissenters
still don’t get the message—or Tinker! Advising a young high school
or grade school student while he is in class that he and other gays and
lesbians are shameful, and that God disapproves of him, is not simply
‘unpleasant and offensive.’ It strikes at the very core of the young
285
student’s dignity and self-worth.” Judge Reinhardt claimed that the
dissenters’ view would leave school officials powerless to prevent
students from wearing t-shirts with slogans such as “Hitler Had the
Right Idea . . . Let’s Finish the Job!” or “Hide Your Sisters—The
Blacks Are Coming” unless and until “minority members chose to
fight back physically and disrupt the school’s normal educational
286
process.” In a short concurring opinion, Judge Gould wrote a short
concurring opinion that stated that schools may restrict “[h]ate
speech, whether in the form of a burning cross, or in the form of a
call for genocide, or in the form of a tee shirt misusing biblical text to
287
hold gay students to scorn.”
Judge O’Scannlain, joined by four other judges, dissented from the
288
denial of rehearing en banc. Judge O’Scannlain stated that “Judge
Kozinski’s powerful dissent explains why the court errs in permitting
school administrators to engage in view-point discrimination on the
basis of a student’s newly promulgated right to be free from certain
289
offensive speech.” The dissenters observed that “Harper’s shirt was
undoubtedly unpleasant and offensive to some students, but Tinker
does not permit school administrators to ban speech on the basis of
‘a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
290
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.’” The dissenters added that “if
displaying a distasteful opinion on a T-shirt qualifies as a
283. Id.
284. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.
2006) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
285. Id. at 1053 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1053–54 (Gould, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 1054 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
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psychological or verbal assault, school administrators have virtually
unfettered discretion to ban any student speech they deem offensive
291
or intolerant.”
In the dissenters’ view, “the panel majority’s decision amounts to
approval of blatant viewpoint discrimination” because “[s]chool
administrators permitted the ‘Day of Silence’ but prohibited Harper
292
from offering a different view.” The dissent stated that “under the
panel majority’s decision, school administrators are now free to give
one side of debatable public questions a free pass while muzzling
293
voices raised in opposition.”
Judge O’Scannlain noted Eugene
Volokh’s observation that the panel majority’s opinion is “a tool for
suppression of one side of public debates (about same-sex marriage,
about Islam, quite likely about illegal immigration, and more) while
the other side remains constitutionally protected and even
294
encouraged by the government.”
While Harper’s claims for injunctive relief were ultimately
295
dismissed due to mootness, this does not negate Harper’s value as
296
persuasive authority. The Ninth Circuit’s reliance upon the “rights
of others” dicta from Tinker has drawn heavy criticism, and one
author has stated that “the Ninth Circuit became the first court in the
thirty-seven years since Tinker to base its decision solely on the
invasion of others’ rights test without applying the substantial
297
disruption test.” Even authors who support the outcome in Harper
have criticized the court’s reliance upon Tinker’s “rights of others”
dicta and have argued that the court should have used traditional

291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1055.
294. Id. (quoting Posting of Eugene Volokh to the Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/posts/1145577196.shtml (Apr. 20, 2006, 19:53).
295. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S. 1262, 1262 (2007).
296. See, e.g., Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d
1072, 1098 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (“‘[A]t minimum, a vacated opinion still carries
informational and perhaps even persuasive or precedential value.’ Therefore,
despite its mootness, this Court may still rely upon the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as
persuasive authority.” (citation omitted)). But see Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514
F. Supp. 2d 168, 179 (D. Mass. 2007) (stating that “Harper lacks precedential value”).
297. Douglas D. Frederick, Note, Restricting Student Speech that Invades Others’ Rights:
A Novel Interpretation of Student Speech Jurisprudence in Harper v. Poway Unified School
District, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 479, 493 (2007); see also Andrew Etter, Note, Student
Speech, the Rights of Others, and a Dual-Reasonableness Standard: Zamecnik ex rel.
Zamecnik v. Prairie District No. 204 Board of Education, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D.
ILL.), 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2008) (“Of the few courts acknowledging the
‘rights of others’ provision in Tinker, most have chosen not to apply it as a separate
standard.”); Frederick, supra, at 492 (“Though the invasion of others’ rights was first
mentioned in Tinker, this test was never applied by that Court. . . . To the contrary,
this test was nothing more than dicta by the Tinker Court.”).
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298

One author supportive of the
“substantial disruption” analysis.
result has explained that “the Ninth Circuit created a completely new
legal framework” in Harper which “essentially created a blank check
for schools to regulate student speech, at least when that speech is
299
anti-homosexual.” In addition, under Harper,
most anti-homosexual speech in schools is subject to regulation
because of its harmful psychological impact on any homosexual
student attending the school. Student speech that inflicts similar
psychological harm on any other individual or specific group is also
potentially subject to regulation under [Harper’s] application of the
300
invasion of others’ rights test.

One scholar has posited that, using the “rights of others” test,
school officials should be permitted to “restrict student speech
reasonably viewed as being offensive to a reasonable student,” which
301
would allow them to “protect[] the delicate psyche of the youth.”
The justification for this more speech-restrictive standard is that
“requiring a history of disturbance before speech can be restricted
provides no recourse for school administrators dealing with first-time
derogatory speech that can cause immediate, and perhaps
302
Under this formulation, the
irreparable, psychological harm.”
message “Be Happy, Not Gay” is acceptable because it “cannot
reasonably be viewed as injurious or derogatory to a reasonable
303
student,” while the message at issue in Harper can be prohibited
304
because of the “overt hostility evident in the message.”
This,
however, shows the inherent malleability of any standard that allows
schools to censor expression due to their perceptions of the alleged
psychological impact of a controversial message. Under Harper,
virtually any message that proclaims the virtue of one religion or
denounces homosexual behavior could be interpreted as a
psychological attack on other students because, in Judge Reinhardt’s
298. See, e.g., Etter, supra note 297, at 1357 n.144 (recognizing that “[s]ome argue
that the Ninth Circuit in Harper reached the right outcome by allowing the school’s
restriction on student speech, but that the court should have looked to the more
common material and substantial disruption language of Tinker rather than using the
rights of others provision”); Frederick, supra note 297, at 498 (“The majority’s
decision in Harper was correct in its result, but its legal rationale is inconsistent with
precedent.”); Mark A. Perlaky, Note, Harper v. Poway Unified School District: The
Wrong Path to the Right Outcome?, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 519, 546 (2007) (“The court
reached the right outcome in Harper v. Poway Unified School District, but there may
have been other, better ways to achieve that outcome.”).
299. Frederick, supra note 297, at 497.
300. Id. at 498.
301. Etter, supra note 297, at 1366.
302. Id. at 1363.
303. Id. at 1361.
304. Id.
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view, “one can[not] condemn homosexuality without condemning
305
homosexuals.”
Given Tinker’s clear protection of controversial student speech, it is
unsurprising that “some critics have called the revival of the ‘rights of
others’ requirement ‘a significant restriction on the First Amendment
rights . . . that were unambiguously guaranteed by Tinker almost forty
306
years ago.’”
One author has noted that “Harper extends so far
beyond Tinker’s limits on student free speech rights that it ultimately
307
contradicts the authority and rationale upon which Tinker rests.”
“[E]ven political speech that touches on a student’s ‘core identifying
characteristics such as race, religion, or sexual orientation’ should
enjoy the same constitutional protection during the school day that it
308
would in public” because “educating high school students to
exercise and endure liberty is more important to a public high
309
school’s fundamental mission than ensuring equality or comfort.”
These commentators have properly identified the conflict between
Tinker’s broad protection of controversial student speech and Harper’s
authorization of censorship of student speech that may offend other
310
students.
It is clear that widespread adoption of Harper’s “rights of others”
analysis would have a broad chilling effect upon student religious
311
expression that could conceivably offend other students.
The
Harper test “easily could prohibit religious speech from a wide variety
of political, social, and religious viewpoints. . . . [D]epending on how
the ‘rights of others’ concept is defined, Tinker’s second test could
312
have a very broad effect.”
In addition, “restricting student speech
under Tinker’s ill-defined second test could be notably easier for
schools than restricting the same speech under the material and
305. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1181 (9th
Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
306. Etter, supra note 297, at 1359 (citation omitted).
307. Brian D. Eck, Note, Rebel Without a Clause: The Right “Rights of Students” in
Nixon v. Board of Education and the Shadow of Freedom Under Harper v. Poway, 6 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 197, 226 (2007).
308. Id. at 199 (citation omitted).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Eck, supra note 307, at 226 (comparing Harper to Tinker and arguing
that Harper went beyond established precedent); Etter, supra note 297, at 1359
(discussing the critique of Tinker’s “rights of others” dicta that was the basis of the
holding in Harper).
311. See Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1192 (9th
Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007) (“The Free Speech Clause permits
public schools to restrict student speech that intrudes upon the rights of other
students. Injurious speech that may be so limited is not immune from regulation
simply because it reflects the speaker’s religious views.”).
312. Bowman, supra note 124, at 206.
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substantial disruption test, especially because religious beliefs often
are central to an individual’s identity and thus a particularly sensitive
313
subject.”
One author asked, “Would a message promoting the traditional
heterosexual two-parent household be as suspect as Harper’s? Is it
entirely irrelevant that Harper responded to school-approved
messages? Do Harper’s intentions matter, especially if our focus is on
314
listener harm?” Under Harper, schools could argue that censorship
of speech that supports traditional marriage or heterosexual twoparent homes is justified by a concern for the psychological wellbeing of other students. While such expression would rarely, if ever,
create a risk of substantial disruption for purposes of traditional
Tinker analysis, Harper gives schools a green light to censor such
expression under the guise of promoting respect for other students.
This would severely hamper students’ ability to express their
viewpoints on controversial political, social, religious, and moral
issues and, as a result, would diminish their education and their
315
preparation to become well-informed citizens.
Harper squarely
conflicts with Tinker and should be criticized or distinguished by
courts considering student speech cases whenever possible.
CONCLUSION
Courts considering whether to follow Harper’s lead should keep in
mind Judge O’Scannlain’s observation that “Tinker does not permit
school administrators to ban speech on the basis of ‘a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
316
unpopular viewpoint’” and that, “if displaying a distasteful opinion
on a T-shirt qualifies as a psychological or verbal assault, school
administrators have virtually unfettered discretion to ban any student
317
speech they deem offensive or intolerant.” Instead, “[i]n the school
context, free speech rights should be as broad as possible so long as
313. Id.
314. Brian J. Bilford, Note, Harper’s Bazaar: The Marketplace of Ideas and Hate
Speech in Schools, 4 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 447, 472 (2008).
315. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969)
(noting that communication between students is not only an “inevitable part of the
process of attending school” but “also an important part of the educational process”
and as such a student “may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects . . . if
he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfere[ing] with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with
the rights of others” (citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
316. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th
Cir. 2006) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
317. Id.
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the school can still maintain discipline and its basic educational
318
purpose.”
The First Amendment’s broad protection of non-disruptive student
speech certainly extends to “controversial” religious, pro-life, or
319
political student expression.
As the district court observed in
320
Gillman ex rel. Gillman v. School Board,
the issue of equal rights for citizens who are homosexual is
presently a topic of fervent discussion and debate within the courts,
Congress, and the legislatures of the States, including Florida. The
nation’s high school students, some of whom are of voting age,
should not be foreclosed from that national dialogue. . . . .
The robust exchange of political ideas is essential in a vibrant,
progressive society and is precisely the type of speech that is
321
sacrosanct under the First Amendment.

When public high school administrators and teachers are
confronted with “controversial” religious, pro-life, or political student
expression that may contradict their viewpoints, philosophies, or
educational goals, they must keep in mind that there is no legitimate
educational function “that they may not perform within the limits of
322
the Bill of Rights.”

318. Hoover, supra note 45, at 65.
319. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
320. 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
321. Id. at 1374–75. The Gillman Court struck down a high school policy that
“prohibit[ed] students from wearing or displaying t-shirts, armbands, stickers, or
buttons containing messages and symbols which advocate the acceptance of and fair
treatment for persons who are homosexual.” Id. at 1361. The paraphernalia
displayed slogans such as “Gay Pride” and “I Support My Gay Friends.” Id. at 1362.
322. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).

